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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 ‘Collective intentionality’, write Schweikard and Schmid in their recent Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy review of the topic, ‘is the power of minds to be jointly 
directed at objects, matters of fact, states of aff airs, goals, or values” (Schweikard and 
Schmid 2013). As Schweikard and Schmid’s broader overview indicates, and as refl ected 
in the current volume, collective intentionality has been primarily deployed in recent dis-
cussions of  human cognition and sociality. In particular, over the past 20 years, collective 
intentionality has been used to explore putatively distinct forms of human cooperation 
and confl ict, the role of institutions in human social life, and even the broader nature of 
social reality itself (Gilbert 1996; Searle 1995; Tomasello 1999; Tuomela 2007). 
 Whatever else it may be, collective intentionality has come to be conceived as some 
kind of crowning achievement of our species, and perhaps of our closest ancestors and 
living relatives, a sort of keystone accomplishment that brings in its wake new forms of 
sociality. Collective intentionality builds on and utilizes forms of individual cognition 
that are themselves distinctively human, whether they be metacognitive, modular, or 
general purpose. In that context, questions about how collective intentionality both 
develops ontogenetically and evolved phylogenetically are important, albeit secondary. 
Th ey are questions about how individuals move, or the species moved, from a state without 
collective intentionality to a state with collective intentionality. Two recent publications 
on collective intentionality from infl uential researchers exemplify this perspective on 
collective intentionality. 
 In his  Making the Social World: Th e Structure of Human Civilization (2010), John 
Searle emphasizes the importance that collective intentionality plays in human sociality 
through its role in creating  institutional reality , elaborating on a view Searle fi rst articu-
lated at length in his  Constructing the Social World , where he had noted that he used 
“social facts” and “collective intentional facts” so as to be coextensive (Searle 1995: 122). 
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For Searle, the collective acceptance or recognition of what he calls “status functions” 
assigned to brute physical facts is what creates institutional reality, and it is institutional 
reality that marks off  distinctive forms of human sociality. Such collective mental phe-
nomena ‘of the sort we get in organized societies are themselves dependent on and 
derived from the mental phenomena of individuals’ (Searle 2010: 4) and, for Searle, all 
‘intentionality, whether collective or individual, has to exist inside individuals’ heads’ 
(2010: 44). So according to Searle, distinctive human sociality is institutionally mediated, 
where institutional reality is brought into existence through forms of collective inten-
tionality, which itself derives from in-the-head individual intentionality. 
 Michael Tomasello’s  A Natural History of Human Th inking (2014) concurs with Searle’s 
view of the signifi cance of collective intentionality for human sociality, and defends a 
particular, two-step evolutionary trajectory for the rise of collective intentionality that 
links it tightly to the origins of human culture. Although individual intentionality is pos-
sessed by humans and our closest living relatives in the primate order, Tomasello takes 
what he calls  joint attention to be distinctively human, resting on forms of sharing or 
small-scale collaborative behavior between restricted numbers of individuals. Joint atten-
tion, in turn, becomes extended as ‘group life as a whole became one big collaborative 
activity, creating a much larger and more permanent shared world, that is to say, a culture’ 
(Tomasello 2014: 5). Th is new collaboration, together with the conventional, institu-
tional, and normative forms of communication it involves, are what Tomasello calls 
 collective intentionality , a kind of  group-mindedness (2014: 5–6) that only human beings 
and their recent ancestors possess. 
 Th e anthropocentric perspective refl ected in such views of collective intentionality are 
manifest more generally in the recent literature. For example, neither Schweikard and 
Schmid’s (2013) article on collective intentionality, nor Chant, Hindriks and Preyer’s 
introduction to their collection  From Individual to Collective Intentionality (2014) even so 
much as mention non-human animal cognition. From such perspectives, an article on 
collective intentionality in non-human animals could be very brief, except insofar as it 
might help to delineate what collective intentionality is not. In short: there isn’t any 
collective intentionality in the non-human animal world to be found. 
 We could, of course, break the visual silence here, avoiding the professional embar-
rassment that one should feel in writing on a non-topic, by discussing all the phenomena 
that one might think involve collective intentionality in non-human animals but don’t 
really, or forms of proto-collective intentionality, or perhaps collective proto-intentionality, 
that one can fi nd in non-human animals. Even so, I think it would be hard to completely 
suppress the thought that one was whistling in the dark, and that summers really are for 
something else. 
 Perhaps, at the end of the day, that’s what readers will think this paper does. Fortu-
nately for me at least (even if not for my summer), I think there is much more to be said 
in a positive and constructive vein about collective intentionality itself in non-human 
animals. Doing so involves probing at the concept of collective intentionality fairly 
directly (Section 2), considering the various forms that collective intentionality might 
take (Section 3), showing some sensitivity to the history of appeals to that concept and its 
close relatives (Section 4), and raising some broader questions about the relationships 
between sociality, cognition, and institutions by discussing two diff erent possible cases of 
collective intentionality in non-human animals: that of the social insects (Section 5) and 
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that of highly social mammals, such as canines (Section 6). If the discussion here is on 
track, then the widely shared perspective on collective intentionality exemplifi ed by the 
work of Searle and Tomasello needs to be reconsidered. 
 2. COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: THE WHAT AND THE WHERE 
 Although “intentionality” is a philosophical term of art, something that is oft en forgot-
ten, the phenomena that it refers to are commonplace, particularly in how we think about 
the mental activities of individuals. Much of that activity is directed at, about, or represents 
how things are, were, or might be, in the world. Our mental lives are suff use with 
activities—believing, desiring, imagining, remembering, pretending, fearing—that are 
representational or intentional in this way. Th us, intentionality is integral to the folk 
conception of individual minds. Indeed, intentionality was taken by Franz Brentano 
(1874) to be suffi  ciently central to having a mind that he famously characterized it as ‘the 
mark of the mental’. 
 Th e primary ground for thinking that individuals have mental states with intentionality 
is epistemic and explanatory: such states are required for us to systematically grasp why 
human agents do what they do. Challenges issued to the claim that individuals have men-
tal states with intentionality, such as behaviorism and eliminative materialism, lost out as 
viable alternatives in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, which long ago made 
peace with an appeal to the intentionality of mental states as an integral part of the explan-
atory toolkit needed to understand human behavior and action (R.A. Wilson 1999). 
 Discussions of  collective intentionality arose more recently from the same kind of epis-
temic ground within the theory of action (Searle 1990), but from the outset faced the 
same challenge that individual intentionality has bettered over time. Th is continuing 
challenge to the idea of collective intentionality is refl ected in the more tentative way in 
which collective intentionality is oft en introduced into discussions of collective human 
action: might we need to posit intentionality that goes beyond the familiar forms of indi-
vidual intentionality in order to explain at least some human social behaviors and actions? 
 More particularly, much human social behavior is cooperative, shared, or joint. We do 
things  together : we work and play, we walk and talk, we celebrate and mourn, we laugh 
and cry. Th ere seems little reluctance to view ourselves as undertaking such behaviors or 
actions together, to accept collective action, in addition to individual action. Even though 
collective action requires (and has received) further philosophical analysis, those who 
want to deny that there is such a thing as collective action face an uphill battle. Collective 
actions, such as building a fi re together or holding hands, are no more ontologically dubi-
ous than the corresponding individual actions. 
 Not so with the underlying states that explain such collective behavior or action itself. 
Collective psychology, group minds, shared and joint cognition of various kinds—
intentions, commitments, beliefs—all seem to invoke a mental ontology that goes beyond 
that of our common-sense thinking about minds and intentionality, and beyond the 
comfort zone that individual intentionality has found for itself in contemporary philo-
sophical thinking about the mind. 
 For this reason, a major issue permeating the collective intentionality literature is 
whether one can provide an adequate account of the phenomena to be explained while 
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restricting oneself to what Schweikhard and Schmid (2013) call the  individual ownership 
claim: ‘collective intentionality is had by the participating individuals, and all the inten-
tionality an individual has is his or her own’. If the individual ownership claim is true, 
then we seem at least primed to reduce collective intentionality to individual intentional-
ity, plus some other non-intentional remainder. And if distinctively human cooperative, 
shared, or joint behavior and action is made possible by collective intentionality, so con-
ceived, then we have a reductionist framework for understanding those aspects of human 
social life. 
 I want to suggest several ways in which one might adjust this overall perspective on 
collective intentionality that makes space for collective intentionality in the non-human 
animal world, but which also appeals to a form of the individual ownership claim. Th is is 
a particular form of what I have, elsewhere (R.A. Wilson 2001, 2004), called the  social 
manifestation thesis . I begin with two reminders, the fi rst about two forms of collective 
action, the second about the variety there is to collective intentionality itself. 
 3. FROM COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY TO COLLECTIVELY ACTING 
 Th e phrase “collective intentionality” itself can take on a reifying tendency: to think of 
intentionality as a thing of some kind that collectives or groups have or possess. Since 
collective action—or, better, collectively acting—is taken to be a relatively unproblematic 
phenomenon, an  explanandum in search of an  explanans , I want to suggest that we begin 
by reminding ourselves of two forms that collectively acting might take, neither of which 
are simply summative of the actions of individuals in the corresponding group. We might 
call these the  distributive and the  joint or  shared forms of collectively acting. 
 A collective or group of individuals acts  distributively when the components of the 
overall action are distributed across the actions of those individuals. A crowd’s gathering 
at one time, and later dispersing, are two distributed forms of collectively acting, some-
thing that a group does through the actions of individuals. But distributive group action 
can also involve specialized individual actions, such as when a group builds a shelter or 
catches some food, where each individual does something distinctive that contributes to 
the overall group accomplishment. 
 In distributive collective action, the group does something that no individual in the 
group herself does, except insofar as she contributes to the collective action itself. To take 
a simplifi ed example, one beaver fi nds and transports waterlogged debris to a particular 
site in a creek; a second beaver then places that material in the growing dam. Th e collective 
action of building a shelter—a beaver lodge or dam—is distributed across this pair of 
actions. To fi nd and transport that material, or to arrange it, is to build a shelter only 
insofar as these component actions form part of the collective action. 
 For there to be  joint or  shared collective action, there needs to be not simply distribu-
tive collective action but in addition some kind of coordinating glue that makes it an 
action that is completed  together intentionally. When a team of contractors builds my 
house, or a restaurant cooks me a meal, there is not simply distributed collective action 
but the kind of coordination and cooperation that makes for joint or shared collective 
action. One hypothesis is that joint or shared  intentionality , particularly shared  inten-
tions, is what provides this coordinating glue. Such shared intentions have been central to 
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the literature on collective intentionality, where they are oft en called “we-intentions”: 
fi rst-person plural intentions. 
 Finally, I turn to the second of my promised reminders. Although collective  intentions 
feature prominently in the literature on collective intentionality, intentions are just one of 
many mental states that might be possessed by individuals or by collectives. An intention 
is a particular kind of propositional attitude or mental act, one related in specifi c ways to 
consciousness, planning, and behavior. But groups, like individuals, may also choose, 
plan, try, remember, perceive, sense, believe, desire, enjoy, or regret. At least in principle, 
each of those mental activities can exemplify collective intentionality. Indeed, it has been 
these forms of putative group-level intentionality that were postulated in both the biolog-
ical and social sciences in the more distant past of our attempts to understand collective 
action via the idea of a group mind. 
 4. GROUP MINDS AND THE SOCIAL MANIFESTATION THESIS 
 As the evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson (1997a, 1997b) pointed out nearly 
20 years ago in the context of his successful revival of group selection as a viable mecha-
nism for evolutionary change, the idea that groups of individual organisms, including 
human agents, have minds of some kind was once widely accepted in the social sciences. 
Wilson pointed to a number of the founders of sociology and anthropology, such as 
Emile Durkheim and William McDougall, as proponents of the idea that human groups, 
as well as human individuals, could literally have minds of some kind. To capture a broad 
set of views that one might argue are found in the works of such fi gures, I characterized 
the corresponding view as follows:
 Group mind hypothesis : groups of individual organisms can have or can be thought 
of as having minds in something like the way in which individual organisms 
themselves can have minds. 
 (R.A. Wilson 2004: 267; cf. R.A. Wilson 2001: S263) 
 Wilson argued that group-level adaptations included not only physical activities but 
cognition, since ‘groups can also evolve into adaptive units with respect to cognitive 
activities such as decision making, memory, and learning’ (D.S. Wilson 1997a, S128). 
Here Wilson took himself to be advocating a form of the group mind hypothesis with 
respect to both human and non-human animals. 
 In exploring both the kind of claim that Wilson makes about the history of the social 
sciences and the contemporary revival of that tradition that he was himself advocating, 
I argued that such revivalist enthusiasm is somewhat misplaced (R.A. Wilson 2001, 2004: 
Ch.11–12). Th is is because much of the relevant literature here is more plausibly viewed as 
advocating not the group mind hypothesis but what I called the  social manifestation thesis :
 social manifestation thesis : individuals have properties, including psychological 
properties, that are manifest only when those individuals form part of a group of 
a certain type. 
 (R.A. Wilson 2004: 281; cf. R.A. Wilson 2001: S265) 
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 According to the social manifestation thesis, it is individuals rather than groups that have 
psychological properties and thus minds, but the social groups to which those individu-
als belong play some kind of important role in the possession of those properties. Th at 
role was not simply as a background condition or as a causal trigger for cognition, but 
partially constitutive or realizing of the manifestation of cognition itself. Having off ered, 
in the previous chapters in the book, a sustained—some might say prolonged—articulation 
and defense of the idea that individual cognition was  extended (R.A. Wilson 1994; Clark 
and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008), I intended the social manifestation thesis to be read as 
a particular form of the hypothesis of extended cognition:
 hypothesis of extended cognition : individual cognition sometimes (regularly, oft en, 
always?) involves the operation of systems that physically extend beyond the body 
of the individual cognizer. 
 (see also Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009; 
Wilson and Clark 2009; R.A. Wilson 2014) 
 Off ering a more defl ationary alternative to the group mind hypothesis, this version of the 
social manifestation thesis has been explored in the contexts of human remembering 
(Barnier et al. 2008), moral psychology (Sneddon 2011), and more general discussions of 
human collective intentionality (Huebner 2013; Rupert 2014; Th einer 2014). 
 Th e basic idea in positing the social manifestation thesis, especially when married 
with the hypothesis of extended cognition, was to pose a challenge to those who viewed 
an ontology populated by group minds and collective intentionality as having the kind of 
explanationist justifi cation already mentioned. By accepting an enriched view of individ-
ual cognition—seeing it as embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive, and recogniz-
ing the social dimensions to this “4E” view of human cognition—and showing that such 
a view could account for at least paradigm cases of putative collective intentionality, the 
challenge to the proponent of group minds was to identify phenomena that require, in 
addition or instead, human  group-level cognition. Th at challenge has been taken up, both 
directly and indirectly, in recent defenses of the group mind hypothesis (e.g. Th einer 
2014; Huebner 2013). 
 As should be clear, the social manifestation thesis itself does not entail the hypothesis 
of extended cognition. As such, that thesis admits of versions that are individualistic not 
only about the  bearers of cognitive states but about the nature of those states themselves. 
Th at is, one could accept the social manifestation thesis and hold both that the bearers of 
intentional states are individuals  and that those states supervene on the intrinsic, physical 
properties of their bearers. Such readings of that thesis are compatible with the dominant 
perspective on collective intentionality articulated by Schweikard and Schmid’s individ-
ual ownership claim that we also fi nd in Searle and Tomasello. 
 Drawing on an analogy to a riffi  ng jazz musician, Tomasello captures the role of the social 
context in modern human cognition in saying that ‘[h]uman thinking is individual 
improvisation enmeshed in a sociocultural matrix’ (2014: 1). Starting from self-contained 
individual intentionality, Tomasello’s shared and collective intentionality are elaborations on 
such head-bound cognition, elaborations that are shaped by and shape new emerging forms 
of human sociality marked by heightened cooperativeness. If Tomasello accepts the social 
manifestation thesis, it is likely to be an individualistic view of that thesis, in both senses. 
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 We have already seen that Searle thinks that ‘intentionality, whether collective or 
individual, has to exist inside individuals’ heads’ (2010: 44). Searle’s antipathy to the 
extended mind, refl ecting his long-standing commitment to individualism about mental 
states, was apparent recently in his off -hand comment that ‘it upsets me when I read the 
nonsense written by my contemporaries, the theory of extended mind makes me want to 
throw up’ (Boag 2014). Th is report of Searle’s (natural?) digestive state refl ects his own 
strong and long-standing commitment to individualism about mental states, and thus 
any version of the social manifestation thesis that he accepts is also likely to be doubly 
individualistic. If Searle rejects the social manifestation thesis, it is likely because he fi nds 
the very idea of socially manifested intentional states to be too close to the other nonsense 
written by his contemporaries that he can’t stomach. 
 Th e fi nal point to make here is that since the 4E view of human cognition makes inten-
tionality very much something that is neither contained within nor bounded by the head 
of the individual cognizer, it sits at best uneasily with the project of providing a reductive 
account of collective intentionality (cf. Rupert 2005). On this view, individual cognition 
itself is  constitutively social , and so there is no reductive pathway leading, either 
ontogenetically or evolutionary, from pre-social individual intentionality to collective 
intentionality to sociality. Refl ection on the sociality and cognition of non-human 
animals can make this claim both more concrete and readily defensible. 
 5. NON-HUMAN ANIMALS, SOCIALITY, AND COGNITION: 
THE SOCIAL INSECTS 
 In the mobile living world, sociality is pervasive, and it is easy to understand why. Living 
agents that move around need to have means of responding (relatively) rapidly to features 
of their local environments that can change (relatively) quickly because of the movement 
of the agent. Th is is why sensory systems are ubiquitous in the mobile living world 
(cf. MacIver 2009). When you are moving around, your proximal environment tends to 
change more rapidly in ways that are relevant to your survival and reproduction than it 
does when you have a sedentary way of life. Th is is why mice have elaborate, quick-time 
sensorimotor systems, but trees do not. 
 And any mobile living agent, unless it is extremely unfortunate or unusual, will oft en 
encounter other mobile living agents that are endowed with something like the same 
capacities and powers that it has, in part because it will be reproduced by, and oft en with, 
other such agents. For a mobile living agent to track, respond to and even anticipate the 
behavior of other mobile agents requires even more sensory or cognitive sophistication 
than simply to track, respond to and even anticipate other kinds of environmental 
resources. 
 Social interactions in the non-human animal world take many overlapping forms. 
Th ey can be, among other things, reproductive, cooperative, competitive, predatorial, 
protective, domineering, resource-securing, mutualistic, exploitative, parasitic, patho-
genic, altruistic, or sacrifi cial. Many of these forms of sociality take place with very little 
cognitive mediation, given that they occur between critters whose individual cognitive 
power is likely quite limited. Much of this sociality is merely aggregative in that it is the 
outcome simply of aggregated individual behaviors that require little coordination with 
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conspecifi cs. Jellyfi sh, like real fi sh, tend to form social aggregates; such jellyfi sh blooms, 
unlike the fi sh schools they may superfi cially resemble, fall into this category. But as per-
haps suggested by the brief discussion of distributive collective action, some forms of 
sociality in non-human animals have generated versions of the group mind hypothesis, 
something missed by an exclusive focus on human agency and collective intentionality. 
 Alongside what I have called the  collective psychology tradition that postulates group 
minds in human social groups, there is an independent  superorganism tradition that 
posits group minds in special sorts of non-human animal social groups (R.A. Wilson 
2004: 274–80). As the name suggests, these special groups are sometimes referred to as 
superorganisms, a term coined by the Harvard entomologist William Morton Wheeler in 
1920 as part of a series of refl ections on insect colonies (Wheeler 1911, 1920, 1923, 1926). 
Although the ascription of mental states to such colonies does not form a central part of 
the early part of the superorganism tradition, more recently entomologists have articu-
lated and defended the group mind hypothesis, particularly with respect to honey bees 
(Seeley et al. (1991); Seeley (1995, 1997, 2003); Seeley and Visscher (2003); see also 
Huebner (2013: 230–33)). 
 Consider the  Hymenoptera —the wasps, ants and bees—which, together with the 
termites, are commonly known as the “social insects.” As their moniker suggests, the 
 Hymenoptera exhibit much sociality—from nest-cleaning behavior to hive temperature 
regulation requiring the coordination of the behaviors of thousands of bees. Although 
individual wasps, ants, and bees clearly have some kind of intentionality, the clearest 
forms it takes are perceptual or sensory in nature, and only dubiously involve what we 
might call  cognition central : belief, reason, and thought. 
 Despite this, social insect colonies as a whole or in sizeable part, accomplish impres-
sive outcomes that are very naturally described by attributing perceptual or sensorimotor 
properties to those groups of organisms. Th ese include the perceptual and communica-
tive abilities involved in gathering information about food sources and the motoric 
capacities to utilize resources and avoid predators and dangers in the world. Some of 
these abilities, such as the ability of a bee colony to locate distance sources of nectar and 
regulate the relative number of foragers and hiver workers in accord with the richness of 
the source, or the ability of a termite colony to rapidly repair damage to its nest, manifest 
both some level of intentionality and a degree of concern over the integrity of the colony. 
Yet it is very implausible to think that these are possessed by  individual members of the 
hive, nest, or colony. In short, the behavior of at least some groups is such that it seems 
directed at self-preservation, where the self here is a colony, and the means of achieving 
that goal involves group-level decision-making that draws on collectively distributed 
perception and sensing. 
 Th e relevant, putative mental activities here—for example, perceiving, remembering, 
deciding, monitoring—are  group-only traits, traits possessed only by a group, and not by 
the individuals that comprise the group. For that reason, appealing to the social manifes-
tation thesis as an explanatory alternative to the group mind hypothesis is much less 
plausible than it is in the case of human cognition, where the traits under consideration 
are  multi-level traits , traits that either individuals or groups could, in principle possess. 
 How is this relevant to collective intentionality? If, following Schweikard and Schmid 
(2013), collective intentionality just is ‘the power of minds to be jointly directed’, there is 
no collective intentionality without individual minds. Georg Th einer has suggested more 
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directly that what he calls “hive cognition” is not really an example of the group mind 
hypothesis, defi ned as the view that ‘there are collective types of minds that comprise two 
or more singular minds among their constitutive parts’ (2014: 301). Since there are no 
singular minds among the constitutive parts of a beehive, there is no more collective 
intentionality in these cases than there is collective intentionality in a single brain that is 
constituted by the non-minded activities of millions of single neurons (cf. Tomasello 
2014: 33). Rather, what we have in hive cognition, as in a brain, is a division of labor 
between many parts of some greater individual, and it is that individual—the hive or the 
brain—that is the cognitive agent. In short, hive cognition is not collective but  individual 
cognition. 
 What strikes me as right about this response is that it rests on the point that the inte-
gration of the individuals in social insect colonies makes very much for an entity that is 
at least organism-like, one of our paradigms of individuals with intentionality (Wilson 
and Barker 2017). But that is also true of the human social groups that have been central 
to the core work on collective intentionality, which is why they have been considered to 
be  persons (e.g. Pettit 2003) or “true believers” (Tollefsen 2002), and the subjects of moral 
responsibility. If the individual-like character of human social groups is not only no bar-
rier to entertaining the question of whether there might be collective intentionality at 
play, but one of the signs that we are considering human social groups of the right kind 
in taking up that issue, then the individual-like character of hives, nests, swarms, and 
colonies of social insects should be viewed in just the same way. 
 Th einer views being composed of components that are themselves intentional agents 
as a necessary condition for some entity to be a candidate for collective intentionality. 
Can we accept this condition and still view hive cognition as exemplifying the group 
mind hypothesis? I think so, since it is plausible to view individual members of the hive 
as having some, limited, form of intentionality, just not the rich level of intentionality that 
seems to emerge in the hive’s actions. But should we accept Th einer’s condition, or 
(for that matter) Schweikard and Schmid’s characterization of collective intentionality as 
‘the power of [individual] minds to be jointly directed’? Once we recognize that the 
singular or individual-level intentionality can be signifi cantly distinctive in both its 
“propositional” and “attitudinal” dimensions from that at the collective level, such views 
seem to me more plausible—more plausible, but also less apt for ruling out hive cognition 
as a form of collective intentionality. 
 In defending hive cognition as exemplifying a type of collective intentionality or group 
mind, Bryce Huebner (2013: 230–33) has noted that social insects should be thought of 
as exemplifying  minimally collective mentality , and that it would be misleading to think 
of them as having mental states such as beliefs and desires. Despite lacking what I have 
previously called  full-blown minds, they nonetheless possess or participate in some rela-
tively constrained sets of focal processes or abilities, such as decision-making, planning, 
or monitoring (R.A. Wilson 2004: 290–91). Since it is this kind of minimal-mindedness 
that has been contested in discussions of group minds in human social groups, the fact 
that hive minds lack the full range of intentional states that individual cognizers possess 
is no reason to deny them group-mindedness. And if there can be group minds without 
individual intentionality of the appropriate kind—perhaps just more restricted forms 
of individual intentionality—then the idea that collective intentionality must derive, in 
some way, from individual intentionality, cannot be correct. 
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 Although so far I have been shift ing between talk of group minds and collective inten-
tionality, it is at this point that a defender of the standard view of collective intentionality, 
according to which collective intentionality derives from individual intentionality, might 
insist on a fi rm distinction here. Th e thought here is that whatever we say about group 
minds in social insects is completely independent of what one should say about genuinely 
 collective intentionality in humans and their closest biological relatives. As Tomasello says,
 Cooperation by itself does not create complex cognitive skills—witness the 
complex cooperation of the cognitively simple eusocial insects and the cooperative 
child care and food sharing of the not-so-cognitively-complex New World 
monkeys, marmosets and tamarins. 
 (Tomasello 2014: 33) 
 While Tomasello is certainly correct that the enriched “we-intentionality” whose ontog-
eny and phylogeny he explores is missing in eusocial insects and other non-human 
animals—individual intentionality here is, at best, very limited—it is less clear that one 
can simply bracket off  the corresponding forms of collective action, whether they be 
merely distributive or joint or shared. Indeed, if one can have both of these forms of 
collective action in psychologically more impoverished circumstances, as I want now to 
suggest, such we-intentionality cannot hold the key to understanding of acting collectively. 
 6. SOCIAL PLAY AND TERRITORY MARKING: 
HIGHLY SOCIAL MAMMALS 
 In past work (R.A. Wilson 2007) I have argued that social play and territory marking in 
non-human animals such as canids poses another kind of challenge to the picture of 
collective intentionality as requiring an enriched, individualistic form of intentionality. 
Although part of that argument was directed at particular claims—about sociality, institu-
tional reality, and status functions—central to John Searle’s (1995) answers to the ques-
tions “what is social reality?” and “what are social facts?”, part of the argument suggests 
that there can be a kind of joint or shared intentionality amongst non-human animals 
that stops short of the full-blown sharing of we-intentions that now form a deep bedrock 
in our own sociality. 
 Social play of the kind that is readily observed in domestic dogs (and less-easily 
observed in non-domestic dogs) involves multiple individuals responding to one anoth-
er’s recognizably play-signaling behaviors, such as arched bows, mock bites, tail-nipping, 
and back-rolling. Social play in canids, like social play in human children, is not simply 
behavior, but behavior that is recognized by the participants in it  as play , as something 
that both or all participants undertake. Like territory marking, social play functions via 
individual intentionality that is sensitive to the social context in which the activity takes 
place. Here shared intentionality gains purchase, I want to suggest, not so much through 
the generation of playful or territory-marking activity, but through its  reception as playful 
or territory-marking . When other conspecifi cs stop treating a behavior as playful, play 
ends, just as their ignoring of a scent as marking out territory takes away that scent’s 
territory-marking function. 
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 Both social play and territory marking in canids and, I think, other highly social mam-
mals, are collective acts involving participants with at least some kind of second-order 
intentionality. I also think that such activities involve some level of joint or shared inten-
tionality since they require that mere behaviors and scents be taken by participants as 
signals of the respective intentionality-laden activities of play and territory marking. 
In this respect, they are representative of a large class of non-human animal behavior, 
including grooming in primates and collective food-sharing in bats, that are generated 
and underwritten by individual-level intentionality that is other-directed in the way that 
we-intentionality is. Such multilevel traits—play, territory marking, grooming, and food 
sharing—could be explained as either an appeal to group-level intentionality or to 
individual-level intentionality. As such, the challenge posed by the social manifestation 
thesis to proponents of the group mind hypothesis remains live: do we need to posit 
intentionality at the group level, as I suspect we do need to in the case of social insects, in 
order to explain this collective behavior, or can we make do with an appeal to individual-
level, socially manifested intentionality? 
 To come back to the conception of collective intentionality exemplifi ed by Searle and 
Tomasello, note that whatever intentionality there is in such cases, it is related to neither 
“institutional reality” nor the enriched forms of we-intentionality central to their concep-
tions of collective intentionality. Th is itself does not imply either that collective intention-
ality plays a special role in structuring institutional facts, or that there are no forms of 
shared intentionality that are distinctively human. But it does suggest that we need a view 
of the relationship between sociality and intentionality, both individual and collective, 
that departs from the individualistic tradition to which both Searle and Tomasello are 
committed. 
 7. CONCLUSION 
 Th e relationships between sociality, collective intentionality, and individuals can inform 
how we think of each of these three relata. I have suggested that Schweikard and Schmid’s 
individual ownership claim, that ‘intentionality is had by the participating individuals, 
and all the intentionality an individual has is his or her own’ can be satisfi ed in at least 
many cases by accepting the social manifestation thesis, particularly by non-individualistic 
versions of that thesis. Collective intentionality might well be possessed by individuals 
without itself being individualistic. 
 Collectively acting is widespread in the non-human animal world. Some of this collec-
tive action is merely distributive, but some of it is very likely also shared or joint, in the 
senses in which I have introduced those terms. Th is does not itself imply that collective 
intentionality has a corresponding range, but it does mean that the very same explana-
tionist motivation for positing collective intentionality in human groups applies to 
non-human animals. 
 Th e signifi cance of the social insects in the present context is that they represent a 
range of cases in which we have both merely distributed and shared or joint collective 
action without much individual intentionality at all. Th us, we either allow that such 
collective action can take place without collective intentionality at all, or that there is 
collective intentionality without we-intentions. 
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 Th e signifi cance of social play and territory marking in highly social mammals, such 
as canids, is that they represent cases in which we have shared or joint collective action 
with individual intentionality that stops short of the full-blown, institution-laden forms 
of we-intentionality that structure much of our own social life. Th us, we either allow, as 
with the case of social insects, that such collective action can take place without collective 
intentionality at all, or that there is collective intentionality of some type that exists 
independent of distinctively human psychology and institutional reality. 
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